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ABSTRACT
Real social graphs datasets are fundamental to understanding a variety of phenomena,
such as epidemics, crowd management and political uprisings, yet releasing digital recordings of
such datasets exposes the participants to privacy violations. A safer approach to making real
social network topologies available is to anonymize them by modifying the graph structure
enough as to decouple the node identity from its social ties, yet preserving the graph
characteristics in aggregate. At scale, this approach comes with a significant challenge in
computational complexity.
This thesis questions the need to structurally anonymize very large graphs. Intuitively, the
larger the graph, the easier for an individual to be “lost in the crowd”. On the other hand, at scale
new topological structures may emerge, and those can expose individual nodes in ways that
smaller structures do not.
To answer this problem, this work introduces a set of metrics for measuring the
indistinguishability of nodes in large-scale social networks independent of attack models and
shows how different graphs have different levels of inherent indistinguishability of nodes.
Moreover, we show that when varying the size of a graph, the inherent node indistinguishability
decreases with the size of the graph. In other words, the larger a graph of a graph structure, the
higher the indistinguishability of its nodes.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Real social network datasets are a fundamental means of research for understanding a
variety of phenomena, such as epidemics, crowd management and political uprisings. The
sudden increase in the number of online social networks has spurred the interest of computer
scientists. In the online social networks that are open for sharing user data, users are not willing
to share personal data fearing misuse by unintended parties. In general, data is shared by online
social networks to advertising agencies for business purposes, and to scientists for research
purposes. Online social networks have strict privacy controls when sharing data and restrict
personal information in the data they release for analysis. Information like names and addresses
are removed before sharing. This is not sufficient for protecting private data if node identities can
be attacked by using background information about network structure. There were several
attacks mounted on the releases of such anonymized data that exposed sensitive user information
by making use of structural properties, such as neighborhood information of popular nodes.
One such example was of an attack on the data released by Netflix in 2006. The
published dataset contained over 100 million movie ratings by over 480 thousand Netflix
subscribers between December 1999 and December 2005. Despite removing all personal
information from the dataset (such as user name, real name, email addresses, etc.), a team of
attackers successfully de-anonymized the dataset and identified 99% of the users correctly [1]

1

Another example was the case of “Jefferson High” school incident. It is part of
the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, which contains very detailed health
information on 100,000 high school students in 140 schools [2]. However, attackers were able to
map out the entire sexual network in 12 of the schools [33] by making use of information
presented by the authors on the certain nodes and their neighbors in the dataset.
Given these proofs of serious privacy risks due to releasing datasets even without
personally identifiable information, much effort has been invested in structurally anonymizing
social graphs. Intuitively, the objective is to change the topology of the graph such that
individual nodes cannot be recognized based on local information that might be available to the
attacker, such as node degree, clustering coefficient or other neighborhood information. At the
same time, for the released, anonymized dataset to be useful, the utility must be preserved.
Utility is typically defined based on a subset of graph properties of the original dataset that need
to be preserved in the anonymized dataset [3, 4].
One significant challenge in structural graph anonymization is the tension between
anonymity and utility [10]. Intuitively, the more the structure of the graph is modified, the better
the anonymity of the nodes and edges in graph, but the more its topological properties change,
the lower the resulting utility. For very large graphs, as today’s available datasets are, preserving
utility while ensuring graph anonymity is computationally challenging. The algorithmic time
complexity in such cases can be in the order of O(|Et|) and O(n2) [5, 6].
1.1 Research Objective
A basic question that has not been asked, to the best of our knowledge, is how inherently
private large graphs are. Since one measure of anonymity is how much effort it takes to break a
secret, computations on large graphs are inherently expensive: the larger the graph, the more
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computational effort is needed to de-anonymize the anonymized version of the graph. We thus
ask: is it true that large real graphs are more private than small real graphs? If this were true,
graph anonymization efforts could be tailored for the size of the graph: smaller graphs would
need more sophisticated anonymization procedures, larger graphs would require less significant
anonymization effort to provide the same guarantees.
To answer this question, we need a way of defining the inherent indistinguishability of
nodes in a graph. In this work, we focus on the indistinguishability of nodes and ignore the issue
of edge anonymity. (We note that there is work that considers edge anonymity as the important
objective for privacy protection [7]). We refer to the inherent indistinguishability of nodes in a
graph as the property of the graph to conceal identifiable topological information for a large set
of its nodes. In this respect, a clique, a ring, a star, and a lattice graph are examples of inherently
private graphs: based on topological properties, all nodes are identical, thus “lost in the crowd”.
This intuition is at the core of k-anonymity anonymization techniques [8, 9].
This thesis defines the inherent indistinguishability of nodes in a graph based on the
notion of linkage covariance introduced in Chapter 3. Aggarwal et al. [10] introduced linkage
covariance as a graph invariant and show that it varies insignificantly in the process of
anonymizing graphs by swapping edges. Consequently, they showed that simple edge-swapping
anonymization techniques are insufficient for providing anonymity, as the signature of the nodes
remains almost intact.
We define the inherent indistinguishability of nodes in a graph as a function of the
percentage of nodes in the graph that have unique linkage covariance signatures [10].
Alternatively, we can reason about the inherent indistinguishability of nodes in a graph by
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analyzing the percentage of nodes that have at least k other nodes with identical signatures (like
k-anonymity).
1.2 Contributions of this Thesis
Existing approaches in the literature do not provide metrics appropriate for measuring the
inherent indistinguishability of nodes in a social graph. Instead, they provide a way to measure
the extent of anonymity by measuring node re-identification after designing specific attacks on
an anonymized network.
We define the inherent indistinguishability of a graph based on two metrics: risk index
and safety index. The risk index measures how many nodes have distinct topological properties
that might give them away. The safety index measures how many copies of nodes with identical
topological properties each node in the graph has.
We follow the work in [10] and investigate the potential of linkage covariance as a metric
of quantifying the inherent indistinguishability of nodes in a graph. Linkage covariance considers
the structural properties as well as the quality of links that connect a node with other nodes to
measure the structural uniqueness of a node in the context of the entire network. To test the
efficacy of such an approach, we use a combination of real-life social graphs and synthetic
graphs. Graph generating techniques such as Erdős–Rényi [31] and Forest Fire [34], to name a
few, generate truly random graph configurations that allows us to validate the approach across
the different graph structures that can exist based on a given size and density.
The contribution of this thesis is three-fold:
1. It proposes metrics based on linkage covariance [10] that measures the
indistinguishability of nodes in a network;
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2. It provides a scalable implementation of linkage covariance for large social graphs;
and
3. It shows that large social graphs are inherently more private than smaller graphs of
similar type.
1.3 Overview
This thesis has the following format: Chapter 2 overviews related work. Chapter 3 details
linkage covariance, metrics that defines the topological relationship between two nodes in the
graph. It also introduces a more scalable algorithm than initially provided in [10] for computing
this metric. Chapter 4 describes the implementation details for computing linkage covariance on
large graphs. Chapter 5 presents our experimental setup and Chapter 6 presents metrics for
measuring the inherent anonymity of real graphs. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes with a summary
and future work.
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CHAPTER 2: RELATED WORK
When measuring the privacy of social graphs, we need to measure the extent to which the
privacy of a node is preserved since privacy is known to be inherently personal, which
recognizes the sovereignty of the individual [11]. It is shown that the de-coupling of node
identities to anonymize social network data is not sufficient for a safe data release [12]. Nodes
could compromise the identity of a neighborhood that they are a part of, providing a key to
disclosing other nodes in the neighborhood. Hence, the structural properties of a graph should
also be anonymized by making use of structural graph anonymization schemes. Broadly
speaking these schemes fall under two major categories: clustering based, and perturbation based
[13]. Clustering-based anonymization schemes deal with anonymizing a graph by representing a
node as a group of nodes in the anonymized version. Perturbation-based anonymization schemes
anonymize the graph by adding or deleting nodes or edges and thereby perturb the structure of
the graph.
As a perturbation-based scheme most relevant to this work, k-anonymity [9] is used to
induce node indistinguishability in a graph such that an individual node is indistinguishable from
at least k-1 others. This technique has been extended to methods like k-degree anonymity [24],
k-isomorphism [25], and k-symmetry [26], techniques that perturb a graph such that at least k
structurally equivalent sub-graph patterns exist. Interested researchers could explore [13] for a
deep-dive into a comparison of different anonymization schemes. In our study, however, we
focus on the quantification of inherent indistinguishability of nodes in a graph, which is
independent of any anonymization mechanisms.
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Many existing quantification techniques measure the de-anonymizability of an
anonymized network relative to an attack conditioned by the availability of seeds and other
auxiliary information.
Pedarsani and Grossglauser [14] discuss the boundaries of anonymity in terms of
fundamental network properties regardless of any specific de-anonymization algorithm. It makes
use of graph sampling techniques to control the structural similarity of the anonymized and
auxiliary graph structures that minimize the cost function of edge-inconsistencies on graph
matching. The study measures the indistinguishability of edge pairs as a measure to introduce
simple conditions on delineating the boundary of privacy, and show that the mean node degree
needs only grow to slightly faster than log n for a network of size n for nodes to be identifiable.
However, this quantification is not suitable in practice since most, if not all, observed real-world
graphs do not follow the Erdős–Rényi model, which they consider. The study does not present
the computational complexity of such techniques.
Later, Korula and Lattanzi [17] have adapted these quantification methods for the
problem of social network reconciliation over Preferential Attachment and Erdős–Rényi models.
They assumed to have dense seeds (structure-aware mappings) in the attack model, without
relying on any specific domain information.
Ji et al. [15] extend the notion of graph matching to find identical edge-wise partners by
introducing a novel cost function based on neighborhood difference, and evaluated against real
world networks. The used quantification to quantify to quantify the degree of de-anonymizability
that is characterized by the graph projection probability. An interesting observation is that the deanonymization results in two datasets with similar graph densities may be very different in
practice. To study the reason for this fact, they consider the degree distribution of respective
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graphs. They found that low degree users, especially first degree users, do not have too much
distinguishable structural information, which implies that they are difficult to be de-anonymized
based on structural information. Consequently, the existence of a large amount of low degree
users in one dataset makes it less de-anonymizable. In general, they conclude that when a dataset
has a high average degree and a small percentage of low degree users, it is easier to deanonymize and a large amount of its users are de-anonymizable; otherwise, datasets with a low
average degree and a large percentage of low degree users are difficult to de-anonymize based
solely on structural information.
Later, Ji et al. [16] introduced the concept of structural-importance aware relative deanonymization wherein they argue that the higher the degree of a node, the higher its structural
importance in the graph. They quantify relative de-anonymization by the availability of seeds.
The seed-based version has a condition on the sampling probabilities and the number of seeds.
Empirical results conclude that graphs with higher average degree and graph density are better in
de-anonymizability which are vulnerable to structure based de-anonymization attacks. The study
also finds that sparse datasets have less structural information to compromise, thus they are
inherently more resilient to structure-based attack models, an inference that we also make.
Several works use the Bayesian inference model to measure the efficacy of an
anonymization scheme [20, 21, 22], where anonymizability is quantified over the number of
incorrect guesses made by the attacker. These measures (e.g., Min Entropy [20], Shannon
Entropy [21, 22]) gauge the distortion caused by the anonymization algorithm. This set of
statistical measures helps in quantifying differentially private algorithms [13].
Berlingerio et al. [19] define NetSimile similarity score to compare k different networks
based on structural features supported by social theories. The paper measures the node

8

overlap between two different graphs without node attribute information but relies on social
theories like Social Capital, Structural Hole, Balance and Social Exchange to measure structural
distance. The experiments are conducted using two different techniques – FSM, which is the
frequent baseline of smaller subgraphs; and EIG, which is the k largest eigenvalues to evaluate
the approach. Their study finds that as real networks are perturbed, the similarity score
decreases, but it remains unchanged for Erdős–Rényi networks though they are perturbed.
A general attack is modeled to capture the likelihood of nodes being re-identified using
machine learning techniques [27]. It is based on a classifier trained on random decision forest to
compare perturbation based graph anonymization schemes. The anonymity of a scheme is
measured by the de-anonymization success achieved by the trained model. The results are
depicted using the performance of the classifier defined by simple statistical methods like
Receiver Operating Characteristic and Area Under the Curve. Moreover, the utility is measured
over degree distribution, average degree distribution, joint degree distribution, average degree
connectivity, degree centrality and the Eigenvector centrality.
Aggarwal et al. [10] present an attack that uses the aggregate covariance behavior of the
network linkage structure. To evaluate the effectiveness of their re-identification algorithm, they
sample random pairs of nodes and measure pair-wise distance as a utility measure. They also
measure deviation of linkage covariance and the node re-identification rate in the pairs as a
measure of privacy. The study finds that the characterizations of the linkage structure of the
graph are robust to perturbation than distance-based utility measures.
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CHAPTER 3: LINKAGE COVARIANCE
This work uses linkage covariance, defined below, as the topological signature of each
node in a network. Based on this signature, we later can measure how common or unique a
node’s signature is, and thus how safe it remains in the “crowd” of a large network.
3.1 Linkage Covariance Definition
We use the definition of linkage covariance as proposed in [10]. Formally, for two nodes
p and q, the definition of linkage covariance LinkCov (p, q) is equal to the covariance between
^

^

the two random variables 𝑋 𝑝 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑋 𝑞 :
^

^

^

^

𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑝, 𝑞) = 𝐸[𝑋 𝑝 ⋅ 𝑋 𝑞 ] − 𝐸[𝑋 𝑝 ] ⋅ 𝐸[𝑋 𝑞 ]
𝑁

𝑁

𝑁

= ∑ 𝑥𝑝𝑘 ⋅ 𝑥𝑞𝑘 /𝑁 − (∑ 𝑥𝑝𝑘 /𝑁) ⋅ (∑ 𝑥𝑞𝑘 /𝑁)
𝑘=1

𝑘=1

𝑘=1
𝑁

𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑝, 𝑞) = 𝐸[𝑋à𝑝 ⋅ 𝑋à𝑞] = ∑𝑘=1 𝑥𝑝𝑘 ⋅ 𝑥𝑞𝑘 /𝑁 = 1 (1)
^

For a given node p, let 𝑋 𝑝 represent the random 0-1 variable, which takes on the value 1,
if node p is linked by an edge to any potentially adjacent node q and 0 otherwise. We have
instantiations of this random variable for all possible (potentially) adjacent nodes q, and the
corresponding instantiation is denoted by 𝑥𝑝𝑞 . The value of 𝑥𝑝𝑞 is 1, if an edge does indeed exist
from node p to node q. The advantage of linkage covariance is that it is robust to edge additions
and deletions for massive and sparse graphs. The linkage covariance for a given node does not
change very easily. Hence, they can be used to define a signature or characteristic vector for that
node. There are several ways of defining this signature or characteristic vector.
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•

When the mapping between two different graphs are completely unknown, we can
create a vector of linkage covariances, which are sorted in decreasing values. The
most natural form of the characteristic vector of node p is defined as the ranked
linkage characteristic vector.

•

When the mapping between two different graphs are approximately known for all
nodes, we can create a sort order of nodes in the two graphs corresponding to this
mapping. The sort order is used to define the signature vector. This provides more
accurate results, when we match the signatures between the two graphs.

An approximate mapping is known for some of the nodes, but in most cases, it is not. In
such cases, if the mapping is known, we use a sort order on the nodes, and to define the
remaining part of the signature, we use a sort order on the magnitudes of the linkage covariances.
3.2 Algorithm
The algorithm for the calculation of the linkage covariance function is illustrated below.
Using the linkage covariance signatures, we find out how many identical groups are present for
all the nodes, and try to evaluate inherent indistinguishability of nodes.
The linkage covariance function begins with the edge list of a graph G. Using the edge
list information, for each vertex 𝑉𝑖 , we get the neighborhood of 𝑉𝑖 with every other node in the
graph G. For all the vertices V in the graph G, we then calculate the linkage covariance of the
vertices 𝑉𝑖 and 𝑉𝑗 as the set difference of the neighbors of vertices 𝑉𝑖 and 𝑉𝑗 respectively. Since
the linkage covariance value is associative, the linkage covariance between vertices 𝑉𝑗 and 𝑉𝑖 is
also the same value. This is shown in the Figure 1 describing Algorithm 1 from lines 5 through 9.
In Line 10, the process of ranking the linkage covariance signatures is done to order the
signatures in monotonically decreasing order. This process is repeated for all the vertices in the
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graph G. We then take the linkage covariance signature of each vertex and compare it with the
linkage covariance signature of every other vertex in the graph. If it is unique, we count the
number and categorize it appropriately. For all non-unique linkage covariance signatures, we
group them based on the size of the group and the number of groups of each size that is identical.
This is shown from lines 11 through 27 of the algorithm. We return the identical groups that are
found from the algorithm for evaluating the inherent indistinguishability of nodes in the graph.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

linkageCovariances(G):
E  Edge list(G)
∀ 𝑉𝑖 ∈ 𝐸 ∶ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝑁(𝑉𝑖 ) | 𝑁(𝑉𝑖 ) 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑉𝑖
LC  ø
for Vi in E:
VS  V(E) \ Vi
for Vj in VS:
LC (Vi, Vj)  |{N (Vi) ∩ N (Vj)}|
LC (Vj, Vi)  LC (Vi, Vj)
LC(Vi)  Sorted vector of {LC (Vi, )} in descending order
UniqueLC  ø
IdenticalGroup  ø
for Vi in E:
VS  V(E) \ Vi
for Vj in VS:
if LC (Vi, ) = LC (Vj, ) then:
if LC[Vi] ∉ UniqueLC then:
UniqueLC ∪ {LC[Vi]}
end
end
Ngroup  ø
for LC in UniqueLC:
𝑁𝐿𝐶 = ∑𝑁
𝑖=1[𝐿𝐶[𝑉𝑖 ] = 𝐿𝐶]
𝑁𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 ∪ {𝑁𝐿𝐶 }
for n in Ngroup:
𝑁𝐿𝐶 = ∑𝑁
𝑖=1[𝐿𝐶[𝑉𝑖 ] = 𝐿𝐶]
𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝[𝑛] = 𝑁𝑙
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝

Figure 1: Algorithm describing the proposed approach for identifying the inherent
indistinguishability of nodes in a social graph
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3.3 Algorithmic Time Complexity
The algorithm for computing the linkage covariance introduced in Figure 1 has the
computational complexity of O(|V|2), where V is the set of nodes in the graph. Although
Aggarwal, Li, and Yu reckon that the negative term in Equation 1 can be ignored in the case of
large and sparse graphs (which is the case for social networks), this time complexity remains
O(|V|2).
3.4 Example
We have shown a flowchart below that illustrates how the algorithm proposed in Section
3.2 works. For example, let us consider a 10-node graph and run the algorithm described in
Section 3.2. The input graph is shown in Figure 3. For this graph, we have shown what the result
in each step of the flowchart in Figure 2 will be.

LC

•For each Vi get neighborhood for all V in graph G
•Compute Linkage covariance for each node with
every other node

Sort

•Have characteristic vector of linkage covariance for
each node
•Sort the vector in descending order

Group

•For each characteristic vector, find unique vectors
•Compare with other vectors and get identical groups

Figure 2: Flowchart of linkageCovariances
Algorithm

Figure 3: An example 10-node graph
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Input graph

Linkage Covariances
1: ['1', '2'],
2: ['1', '2', '1'],
3: ['1', '1', '1'],
4: ['1', '1', '1'],
5: ['1', '1', '1', '1', '1'],
6: ['1', '1', '1', '1', '1'],
7: ['2', '1'],
8: ['2', '1', '1', '1', '1'],
9: ['1', '1', '1'],
10: ['1', '1', '1', '1', '1']}

Sort
1: '2-1',
2: '2-1-1',
3: '1-1-1',
4: '1-1-1',
5: '1-1-1-1-1',
6: '1-1-1-1-1',
7: '2-1',
8: '2-1-1-1-1',
9: '1-1-1',
10: '1-1-1-1-1'

Linkage Covariance Groups
1 2
2 1
3 2
Figure 4: LinkageCovariances Algorithm on the example shown in
Figure 3.
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CHAPTER 4: IMPLEMENTATION FOR SCALE
Social graphs have millions of nodes, but are sparsely connected. To explore the viability
of applying linkage covariance on real-life social graphs, it is necessary to leverage scaling
methodologies and parallel processing techniques to alleviate the computational burden required
to process graphs of this order.
4.1 Proof of Concept Implementation in R
Initial implementation of linkage covariance as a proof-of-concept model was done in R
for ease of prototyping. However, due to R’s inherent issues with handling large data and its data
structures with high memory costs, scaling the model to process graphs beyond 10,000 nodes
was not possible. The data structures available in R allowed processing of graphs in the form of
matrices which requires processing memory to be of the order |V|2 for a graph with V set of
nodes. When scaling beyond 10,000 nodes, this translates to more than a million data points for
computing linkage covariance. Additionally, when considering the computational complexity of
the algorithm at O(|V|2), scaling beyond 10,000 nodes was not viable. For a 5,000-node graph,
the program took approximately 6 hours to complete. When the program was tested for a 10,000node graph, the program caused out-of-memory errors.
To enable the computation of linkage covariance on graphs of more than 10000 nodes,
we introduced two techniques. First, we rewrote the code to reduce the memory footprint, which
required a different programming language, for which we chose Python. Second, we re-wrote the
code using multi-threading. In the following section, we present the techniques for reducing
memory footprint and multi-threading.
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4.2 Reducing Memory Footprint
Aggarwal and Liu have formulated the value of linkage covariance [10] as mentioned in
Chapter 3. In graph parlance, the first term in the equation represents the common neighbors
between nodes p and q. The second term translates to the product of the degrees of nodes p and q
respectively. Considering large social graphs, Aggarwal and Liu mention in the study [10] that
the second term in the Linkage Covariance calculation can be omitted since it will give rise to a
very small value. Thus, the equation for calculating linkage covariance reduces to
^

^

𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑝, 𝑞) = 𝐸[𝑋 𝑝 ⋅ 𝑋 𝑞 ] (2)
The above equation reduces the linkage covariance formula to just consider the common
neighbors between nodes p and q, over the number of nodes N as shown below.
𝑁

𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑝, 𝑞) = 𝐸[𝑋à𝑝 ⋅ 𝑋à𝑞] = ∑𝑘=1 𝑥𝑝𝑘 ⋅ 𝑥𝑞𝑘 /𝑁 (3)
This contributes to the reduction in memory footprint. In addition to this, the value of the
number of nodes N for large social graphs will be very high. But large social graphs are sparse,
so the common neighbors between a pair of nodes will be a small number. Hence, the above
equation 3 will give rise to a floating-point value. To make computation easier, since the linkage
covariance value is going to be uniform for all nodes, we get rid of the division by N, the number
of nodes. This reduces memory footprint considerably since there will be |V|2 different values of
linkage covariances. After this level of optimization, the equation for computing linkage
covariance becomes as shown below.
𝑁

𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑝, 𝑞) = 𝐸[𝑋à𝑝 ⋅ 𝑋à𝑞] = ∑𝑘=1 𝑥𝑝𝑘 ⋅ 𝑥𝑞𝑘 (4)
Additionally, we improve the time complexity of the algorithm by exploiting the
symmetric nature of the adjacency matrix of a graph. This means that the linkage covariance of
node (p, q) is equal to the linkage covariance of node (q, p). Hence this associative property
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allows us to process only one half of the adjacency lists and obtain the linkage covariance of all
nodes in the graph. When we employ this method to get the linkage covariance values for all
nodes in a graph against all the other nodes in the graph, we found that due to large social graphs
being sparse in nature, most of the node pairs did not have common neighbors, thereby creating a
lot of zeroes as linkage covariance values. Since the linkage covariance characteristic vector, as
described in Chapter 3 is a signature of each node, it is an overhead in the context of the data
structure as well as unnecessary computation to proceed to the next step where each
characteristic vector is sorted in monotonically decreasing order. Hence, after calculating the
linkage covariance between two nodes, we write the value to the signature only if it is not zero,
thereby stripping the signature vector of all zeroes. This significantly reduces the memory
footprint of the implementation.
Finally, we made use of the dictionary data structure available in Python to make look-up
and sort efficient and quick. Since dictionaries offer a significant speedup and are a memory
efficient data structure, this vastly decreases the memory footprint of the implementation as
against making use of matrices.
4.3 Parallelizing Linkage Covariance Calculation
At its core, the algorithm’s complexity remains O(|V|2). However, we can reduce the time
required to complete one iteration of the linkage covariance calculation by parallelizing its
processing steps.
We use threads to parallel process the algorithm. We ensure that the shared resources, in
this case, the social graph object available as an adjacency list, and the resultant linkage
covariance signature vectors are limited to only the pre-computed neighbor sets for each node
and the final linkage covariance value.
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We have designed the thread in such a way that the algorithm would split the linkage
covariance computation process for the graph equally over k threads given m cores of a processor
where k<=m. Additionally, we sort the linkage covariance vector in monotonically decreasing
order to ensure that the linkage covariance vector would be more characteristic of the node’s
quality of links towards its neighbors. It would also account for the random nature of thread
execution. The sorting algorithm also contributes significantly towards the computational
complexity of the algorithm and was improved by using an indirect sorting algorithm with
quicksort at its core.
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CHAPTER 5: EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The objective of this thesis is an empirical evaluation of the inherent indistinguishability
of nodes in graphs at different sizes. Our hypothesis is that larger graphs will have a larger
percentage of their nodes with similar or identical structural signatures, which will make them
more protected in the event of a re-identification attack. Thus, for the empirical component of
this work:
1. We select a set of representative social graphs (described in Section 5.2.1);
2. We generate a number of synthetic graphs similar to the real datasets, which enable us
to vary graph size while maintaining some of the original graph properties (Section
5.2.2);
3. We introduce two measures for inherent indistinguishability of nodes based on the
linkage covariance presented before (Section 5.3);
We describe the computation platform in which we ran the experiments below.
5.1 Computing Platform
The experiments were conducted on the XSEDE supercomputing systems maintained by
the University of Texas at Austin. The XSEDE system comprises of three different subsystems,
namely, Stampede, Maverick and Wrangler. The experiments were primarily conducted on the
Wrangler Data and Analytics system, whose technical specification is described below:
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1. A 10 PB disk based storage system
2. A cluster of 96 Intel Haswell based analytics servers
3. A 0.5 PB shared flash storage system able to support data I/O at unprecedented rates
across the analytics system
Each analytics node has 24 cores and 128 GB of volatile memory with both Infniband FDR and
40 Gb/s Ethernet connectivity. Wrangler has a maximum potential network throughput of 200
Gb/s for ingesting and accessing data.
We are grateful to the XSEDE supercomputing cluster for their allocation of the TACC
Data Analytics System (Wrangler): 1,000.0 Node Hours and TACC Long-term Storage
(Wrangler Storage): 500.0 GB. Wrangler has provided the computing cluster that has supported
our research on the inherent indistinguishability of nodes in large social graphs.
5.1.1 Performance of Scalable Implementation
The implementation in Python was more memory efficient and computationally less
intensive than the R implementation. This is highlighted by the time taken to execute the
algorithm. The original R implementation was unable to scale for large social graphs beyond
5000 nodes in some cases. But the Python implementation with threads completed execution on
an average of 7,530 seconds for a graph with 75,879 nodes.
To check correctness of implementation across R and Python versions, we used a smaller
test dataset to verify the results. We considered the “terrorist network” graph dataset with 63
nodes and 154 edges. Both the R and Python implementations produced the same result. We also
tested the implementations on “Sweden 5000” graph, a bigger graph dataset. The results were a
match again. This ensured that the implementation in Python was correct and was hence used for
computing the linkage covariances of larger social graph datasets.
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5.2 Datasets
From the many public repositories of graph datasets [28, 29, 30], we selected three
datasets of varying characteristics.
5.2.1 Real Datasets
We used soc-Epinions1 [28], soc-SlashDot0811 [29], and BlogCatalog3 [30]. The
properties of these datasets are provided in Tables 1 and 2. Each of these graphs have different
graph characteristics, such as density, clustering coefficient and average path length.
Table 1: Size of the real social graph datasets.
Graph
BlogCatalog3
soc-Epinions1
soc-SlashDot0811

Description
A social blog directory
A who-trust-whom online social network
A technology-related news website

Nodes
10,312
75,879
77,360

Edges
333,983
508,837
905,468

Table 2: Properties of the real social graphs.
Graph
BlogCatalog3
soc-Epinions1
soc-SlashDot0811

Graph
Average Path
Density
Length
0.006282
2.382352
0.000177
4.307860
0.000303
4.024371

Global Clustering
Coefficient
0.091392
0.065679
0.024157

5.2.2 Synthetic Datasets
Synthetic datasets are important for what-if scenarios, extrapolations, and simulations
when real life social graphs are impossible to collect (e.g., a very large friendship graph between
people). In our case, we want to be able to vary the size of the graph while preserving, as much
as possible, the properties of real graphs. To this end, we selected two models for graph
generation, based on the Erdős–Rényi model and the Forest Fire graph dynamics algorithm. The
parameters of these models were chosen such that the synthetic graphs have similar graph
properties to those of the real-life graphs. While generating graphs of different sizes using the
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Erdős–Rényi model, we maintained the average degree constant and equal to that of the real
graph. In the case of the Forest Fire model, we first calibrate the model to generate a graph with
the same number of nodes and edges (as much as possible) as the real graph. We then use the
same calibrated model parameters to generate graphs of various numbers of nodes.
5.2.2.1 Erdős–Rényi Model
The Erdős–Rényi model in graph theory is a model for random graph generation. As per
the model, all graphs on a fixed vertex set with a fixed number of edges are equally likely. The
Erdős–Rényi model of graph generation has traditionally been used in probabilistic methods to
prove the existence of graphs satisfying various properties. The model has also been used to
provide a solid theory of what it means for a property to hold good for almost all different types
of graphs.
The Erdős–Rényi model can be generated using different ways:
1. Specifying the number of nodes and the number of edges. In this case, from the
collection of all graphs that have the specified number of nodes and edges, a graph is
chosen uniformly at random. This is generally called the G (V, E) model, where V is
the number of vertices and E, the number of edges.
2. Specifying the number of nodes and an edge probability along with the number of
nodes, a graph is generated at random. An edge is included in the graph with
probability p that is independent from all the other edges. This is generally called the
G (V, p) model, where V denotes the number of vertices and p, the edge probability.
𝑉

𝑝𝐸 (1 − 𝑝)(2 )−𝐸 (5)
Since p is a probabilistic value, it ranges from 0 to 1. As p tends from 0 to 1, the graph
model becomes more likely to generate graphs with more edges and vice versa. The G (V, p)
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model is commonly used as it allows for freedom with choosing edges using the probability
value p.
For the Erdős–Rényi model, the parameters were tuned for fair comparison by using the
edge probability value given by Equation 5.
𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝 =

𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠
(6)
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠

where the number of real edges corresponds to the number of edges of the real-life graph which
we are trying to simulate; and, the number of possible edges is the number of edges in a fully
connected graph.
5.2.2.2 Forest Fire Model
The Forest Fire Model [31] is based on having new nodes attach to a network. It is a rich
enough class of model that was specifically designed to model densification power law with
shrinking effective diameters, and nodes with high out-degrees, as is observed in most real social
graphs.
Let us consider a node V1 joining the network at time t > 1, and let Gt be the graph
constructed until now. V1 forms out-links to the already existing nodes in G t by first choosing an
ambassador node V2 uniformly at random. Now a link is formed between V 1 and V2. Then, a
random number x is generated binomially distributed with mean (1 − p)

−1.

V1 then selects x

links incident to V2, choosing from both in and out links. The model selects in-links with
probability r times less than out-links. Let V21, V22, ..., V2x denote the other ends of these
selected links. Using these, the node V1 forms out-links to V21, V22, ..., V2x and then goes through
the process of selecting links recursively to each of V 21, V22, ..., V2x. Graph construction is
acyclic, since the nodes with its edges that is already burnt are not visited another time. Thus, the
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“burning” of links in Forest Fire model begins at V 2, spreads to V21, V22, ..., V2x, and continues
recursively until it dies out.
The Forest Fire model requires three parameters for graph generation - forward spreading
probability, backward factor and number of ambassadors. In every time step, a new vertex is
added to the graph. The new vertex chooses an ambassador (or more than one) and starts a
simulated forest fire at its ambassador(s). The fire spreads through the edges with a spreading
probability. The fire may also spread backwards on an edge. When the fire ends, the newly
added vertex is connected to the vertices “burned” in the previous fire. Unlike Erdős–Rényi, the
Forest Fire model is a growing graph model, as such the nature of the graph generation is purely
random depending solely on the probabilistic values provided.
5.2.2.3 Synthetic Graphs
Using the algorithms described above, we generated synthetic graphs with the number of
nodes reduced by factors of 2, 5 and 10 with respect to the number of nodes of the real graphs.
Table 3 provides the parameters that are used to generate the synthetic graphs as in our
description above.
Table 3: Values for the probabilistic parameters to be passed to the synthetic graph generators
of the real datasets.
Dataset
BlogCatalog3
soc-Epinions1
soc-Slashdot0811

Erdős–Rényi
p

fw_prob

0.006282
0.000177
0.000303

0.400
0.350
0.354

Forest Fire
bw_factor
ambassadors
5
0.496
2
0.560
3
0.560

Tables 4, 5 and 6 below provide the graph characteristics of the real graphs
BlogCatalog3, soc-Epinions1 and soc-Slashdot0811 datasets and their synthetic equivalents
respectively.
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Table 4: Characteristics of the Original and Synthetic Datasets derived from the BlogCatalog3
graph dataset.
Graph

Nodes

Edges

BlogCatalog3
Erdos-Renyi
Erdos-Renyi/2
Erdos-Renyi/5
Erdos-Renyi/10
Forest-Fire
Forest-Fire/2
Forest-Fire/5
Forest-Fire/10

10312
10,312
5,156
2,062
1,031
10,312
5,156
2,062
1,031

333983
334,892
166,991
66,783
33,391
331,710
158,719
56,412
25,641

Graph
Density
0.006282
0.006299
0.012566
0.031429
0.062887
0.006239
0.011943
0.026548
0.048291

Average
Path Length
2.382352
2.653722
2.425060
2.094773
1.952818
2.422267
2.350246
2.245819
2.153811

Global Clustering
Coefficient
0.091392
0.006287
0.012570
0.031363
0.062689
0.054213
0.086814
0.137532
0.198094

Table 5: Characteristics of the Original and Synthetic Datasets derived from the soc-Epinions1
graph dataset.
Graph

Nodes

Edges

soc-Epinions1
Erdos-Renyi
Erdos-Renyi/2
Erdos-Renyi/5
Erdos-Renyi/10
Forest-Fire
Forest-Fire/2
Forest-Fire/5
Forest-Fire/10

75879
75,879
37,939
15,175
7,587
75,879
37,939
15,175
7,587

508837
508,965
254,415
101,762
50,877
506,502
252,780
99,559
49,660

Graph
Average Path
Density
Length
0.000177
4.30786
0.000177
4.619275
0.000354
4.354577
0.000884
3.972669
0.001768
3.721367
0.000176
4.040610
0.000351
3.924914
0.000865
3.760569
0.001726
3.622492

Global Clustering
Coefficient
0.065679
0.000180
0.000369
0.000899
0.001678
0.018941
0.028309
0.045383
0.065230

Table 6: Characteristics of the Original and Synthetic Datasets derived from the socSlashdot0811 graph dataset.
Graph
soc-Slashdot0811
Erdos-Renyi
Erdos-Renyi/2
Erdos-Renyi/5
Erdos-Renyi/10
Forest-Fire
Forest-Fire/2

Nodes

Edges

77,360
77,360
38,680
15,472
7,736
77,360
38,680

905,468
904,816
452,734
181,093
90,546
910,673
451,978

Graph
Density
0.000303
0.000303
0.000605
0.001513
0.003026
0.000306
0.000604

25

Average
Path Length
4.024371
3.865760
3.697908
3.395790
3.124380
3.359442
3.302968

Global Clustering
Coefficient
0.024157
0.000294
0.000612
0.001484
0.003003
0.011430
0.019180

Table 6 (Continued)
Graph
Forest-Fire/5
Forest-Fire/10

Nodes

Edges

15,472
7,736

179,552
87,341

Graph
Density
0.001500
0.002919

Average
Path Length
3.156973
3.048142

Global Clustering
Coefficient
0.033705
0.051937

5.3 Metrics for Computing Inherent Indistinguishability of Nodes in a Graph
We measure how “lost in the crowd” each node of a graph is in terms of its underlying
structural similarity with other nodes in the graph. We do this by examining the linkage
covariance signature of each node of the graph and comparing it with the linkage covariance
signature of every other node in the graph.
We report the percentage of nodes that have unique linkage covariance signatures and
refer to it as a risk. Intuitively, the higher the percentage of nodes with unique linkage
covariance, the more vulnerable they are to attack.
As a measure of safety, we report the average number of replicas in terms of linkage
covariance signature that the nodes with non-unique signatures have in the graph. The larger the
mean number of replicant nodes are, the harder should be for an attacker to properly identify the
node. This safety measure is related to the concept if k-anonymity in a graph. K-anonymity is
one objective of graph anonymization, in which each node in the anonymized graph belongs to a
group of at least k nodes with identical properties. While previous literature defined such node
properties as degree, graph density, and structural properties such as average path length and
neighborhood characteristics, we considered the linkage covariance. Because linkage covariance
captures more topological information about the node’s neighborhood than degree, graph density
or the structural properties such as average path length and neighborhood characteristics, we
believe it is a stronger measure of indistinguishability of nodes in a graph.
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These two metrics allow us not only to quantify the inherent indistinguishability of nodes
in a family of graphs of various sizes, but also to compare different graphs.
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CHAPTER 6: EMPIRICAL RESULTS
To measure node indistinguishability, we plot the cumulative distribution function of the
number of nodes in groups with the same linkage covariance signatures against the natural
logarithm of the size of the groups. This allows comparing graphs of different sizes, and the real
graphs and their synthetic equivalents.
In each case, we generated 5 synthetic graphs for every set of parameters for every
model. This chapter reports results based on the average of these runs.
6.1 BlogCatalog3
Figure 5 shows that 99.4% of the nodes in the graph have unique linkage covariance
signatures. This means that the risk index is high, as also shown in Figure 9. Moreover, due to
the small size of the graph, the synthetic graphs generated by both the Erdős–Rényi and Forest
Fire models have at most two groups of nodes each based on linkage covariance signatures.
Specifically, all nodes in all the FF graphs have unique linkage covariance vectors, thus any node
is uniquely identifiable by an attacker if given sufficient information about its 2-hop
neighborhood. The ER graphs have two groups of nodes each based on linkage covariance
signatures. This is reflected by the single data point for FF graphs in the Figure 5.
6.2 Soc-Epinions1
The soc-Epinions1 graph is inherently more private than the BlogCatalog3 graph: 33.8%
of the nodes in soc-Epinions1 are uniquely identifiable (as compared to 99.9% in BlogCatalog).
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Unlike in the previous example, the Erdős–Rényi graphs of all sizes generated (shown in red in
Figure 6) are more inherently private than the real dataset: a very small percentage of nodes are
uniquely identifiable (0.6% – 6.4% for graphs of 37,940, 15,176, 7,587 nodes, respectively), and
a larger percentage of nodes have more replicas than the nodes in the real dataset. Thus, the ER
graphs have both a low risk index and a high safety index.

Figure 5: Cumulative distribution function plot of the BlogCatalog3 dataset showing the
identical groups of the real and the synthetic datasets.
Forest Fire graphs, on the other hand, appear less private than the real graph: 59.79% of
their respective nodes are uniquely identifiable (thus, a high risk index) and of the remaining
40.21% nodes with replicas, 65.4% have fewer than 50 replicas.
In terms of how inherent indistinguishability of nodes in a graph fares with scale, we
observe that the larger the graph, the higher the indistinguishability of nodes in a graph. For
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example, for the ER family of graphs, the largest graph (of 75,879 nodes) has 0.25% of uniquely
identifiable nodes while the smaller (of 7,587 nodes) has 6.44%. At the same time, the number of
replicas for the nodes with similar linkage covariance signatures with others varies between
99.4% to 97.7%. The same pattern is evident for the FF family of graphs. The nodes with
uniquely identifiable linkage covariance signatures vary from 59.79% to 70.36%. The number of
replicas for the nodes with the similar linkage covariance signatures with others varies between
40.21% to 29.64%.
In this case, the real dataset is in between ER and FF graph families and follows more
accurately the FF slopes.

Figure 6: Cumulative distribution function plot of the soc-Epinions1 dataset showing the
identical groups of the real and the synthetic datasets.
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6.3 Soc-Slashdot0811
The soc-Slashdot0811 graph is inherently more private than the BlogCatalog3 graph, but
less private than the soc-Epinions1 graph: 42.03% of the nodes in soc-Slashdot0811 are uniquely
identifiable (as compared to 99.9% in BlogCatalog3 and 33.8% in soc-Epinions1). The Erdős–
Rényi graphs of all sizes generated (shown in red in Figure 7) are more inherently private than
the real dataset: a very small percentage of nodes are uniquely identifiable (1.5% – 53.24% for
graphs of 38,930, 15,572, 7,786 nodes, respectively), and a larger percentage of nodes have more
replicas than the nodes in the real dataset. Thus, the ER graphs have both a low risk index and a
high safety index.
Forest Fire graphs, on the other hand, appear less private than the real graph: 81.6% of
their respective nodes are uniquely identifiable (thus, a very high risk index) and of the
remaining 18.4% nodes with replicas, 94.22% have fewer than 50 replicas.
In terms of how inherent indistinguishability of nodes in a graph fares with scale, we
observe that the larger the graph, the higher the indistinguishability of nodes in a graph in this
case too. For example, for the ER family of graphs, the largest graph (of 77,860 nodes) has
1.56% of uniquely identifiable nodes while the smaller (of 7,587 nodes) has 53.25%. At the same
time, the number of replicas for the nodes with similar linkage covariance signatures with others
varies between 98.5% to 46.76%. This pattern is evident for the FF family of graphs. The nodes
with uniquely identifiable linkage covariance signatures vary from 1.5% – 53.24%. The number
of replicas for the nodes with the similar linkage covariance signatures with others varies
between 40.21% to 29.64%.
In this case, the real dataset is in between ER and FF graph families and follows more
accurately the FF slopes.
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Figure 7: Cumulative distribution function plot of the soc-Slashdot0811 dataset showing the
identical groups of the real and the synthetic datasets.

6.4 Comparing the Inherent Indistinguishability of Nodes of Different Graphs
A different way to look at the risk and safety indices of different graphs is shown in
Figures 8, 9, 10, 11. The X axis shows the risk metric (the percentage of nodes with uniquely
identifiable linkage covariance signatures) and the Y axis shows the safety metric (the average
number of nodes with replicas in the linkage covariance signatures in the graph). The closer a
graph is to the top left corner of the plot, the more private it is; conversely, the closer to the
bottom right corner of the plot, the less private it is. This is an extreme scenario.

32

Figure 8 represents the comparison of the soc-Epinions1 real and synthetic datasets. As
already inferred from the previous plots, the ER family of graphs is significantly more private
than the FF family: both their risk index is lower and their safety index is higher. Again, the real
dataset is shown in between, with a much higher safety index but a moderate risk index. When
comparing graphs of the same time but at different scales, the larger the graph, the more private
it is in both metrics.

Figure 8: Indistinguishability comparison plot of the soc-Epinions1 dataset and its synthetic
equivalents.

The extreme scenario is best shown by the BlogCatalog1 plot in Figure 9, where the real
graph is inherently private while the synthetic graphs are at the extreme).
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Figure 9: Indistinguishability comparison plot of the BlogCatalog1 dataset and its synthetic
equivalents.
Figure 10 shows the comparison of the soc-Slashdot0811 real and synthetic datasets. As
already inferred from the plot in Figure 8 for the soc-Epinions1 graph, the ER family of graphs is
significantly more private than the FF family in this case: both their risk index is lower and their
safety index is higher. The real dataset is shown in between, with a much higher safety index but
a moderate risk index.
Figure 11 places all real datasets in the same normalized space and shows how we can
compare the inherent indistinguishability of nodes of different graph datasets. The soc-Epinions
is the clear winner, with lowest risk and the highest safety indices of all.
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Figure 10: Indistinguishability comparison plot of the soc-Slashdot0811 dataset and its synthetic
equivalents.

Figure 11: Comparison of indistinguishability of nodes of all the real social graph datasets.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis, we asked whether large social graphs are inherently more private than their
smaller counterparts. To this end, we used the linkage covariance metric to represent the local
position of individual nodes of a given graph. Empirical results show that large graphs are
inherently more private than smaller graphs from the same family. In the process, we proposed a
scalable implementation for the computation of linkage covariance and a set of metrics for
quantifying inherent indistinguishability of nodes in a graph.
We also learned that the Erdős–Rényi graph generation model produces more private
graphs than the Forest-Fire model: Erdős–Rényi graphs have fewer uniquely identifiably nodes
and their nodes can be grouped in larger groups of the same linkage covariance.
This effort can be applied in the space of graph data anonymity in various ways. For
example, one can set a desired maximum risk index and a desired minimum safety index and
selectively apply anonymization techniques to the graph datasets that do not meet the desired
criteria. Alternatively, the anonymization of a graph can selectively target the at-risk nodes (i.e.,
those with unique linkage covariance signatures or with small safety index) and perturb only
their local neighborhoods.
This work also opens a new set of research directions.
•

Improving linkage covariance methodology to k-hop neighborhood. While the current
definition of linkage covariance includes the number of direct common neighbors
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of two nodes in the graph, we could extend this definition to consider the more
remote common neighbors (for example, a 2-hop neighbor of A and a direct neighbor
of B will contribute to the value of the new linkage covariance definition). This
approach would capture structural information about a larger local neighborhood and
be used to measure the resilience against a stronger attacker.
•

Testing the claims of anonymity made by measuring the inherent indistinguishability
of nodes in a graph using the metrics proposed in this thesis by creating an attack
model that uses linkage covariance information to de-anonymize a dataset.

•

Creating an anonymization technique based on node indistinguishability and linkage
covariance. Linkage covariance vectors can be used as the underlying metric for
quantifying structural difference between two graphs.
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